There was a time when Pan Am represented the pinnacle of global aviation, a carrier so dominant internationally that it became synonymous with air travel itself. But listening to United Airlines’ head of global network planning this week, it is clear that the modern reality has quietly surpassed that legacy.
United Airlines Has Built A Global Network Far Larger Than Pan Am Ever Had
At a media briefing earlier this week, United’s Patrick Quayle, SVP of Global Network Planning and Alliances, made a striking comparison that caught me by surprise:
“Our global network is four times larger than Pan Am in their international heyday.”
Now Pam Am’s heyday occurred before I was even born, but his statement was a reminder of how much the airline industry has changed, and how quietly United has built something unprecedented in scale.
Pan Am, for all its mythology, operated in a very different world. It dominated longhaul flying at a time when international travel was limited, heavily regulated, and far less accessible. Routes were fewer, frequencies were lower, and competition was constrained.
United, by contrast, is operating in a fully liberalized, hyper-competitive global market. And yet, it is not just competing…it is building a network that dwarfs anything that came before it.
This Is Not Just About Size, But Structure
It is tempting to dismiss this as a simple numbers game, but that would miss the more interesting point.
United’s network is not just bigger, but built in a competitive world in which longhaul routes were not carved out like colonial empires dividing spoils.
Quayle outlined a system built around what he described as “patterns, gauge, and premium.” That sounds like consultant language, but the execution is clear when you look at how United has organized its hubs.
Newark has become the airline’s primary longhaul gateway across the Atlantic, now serving 42 destinations in that region alone and 88 international destinations overall. Houston has grown into a powerhouse for Central and South America, with more connectivity than even Miami to Central America. Denver, once an afterthought for longhaul flying, is now the fastest-growing hub in the country with three times more European flying than in 2019. Chicago remains a massive connectivity engine, with more than 200 destinations and a growing longhaul footprint.
This is not random growth. It is specialization that has been years in the making. Each hub has a role, and together they form a network that is both broader and more flexible than anything Pan Am ever operated.
Scale Is Being Built On Domestic Foundations
Another piece of this story that often gets overlooked is how United is feeding that global network.
Before the pandemic, roughly a third of United’s domestic departures were operated by single-class 50-seat regional jets. Today, that number has dropped to about 10%, with two-thirds of departures now on mainline aircraft.
Bigger planes mean more seats, more premium capacity, and more efficient feed into longhaul routes. It is part of a broader strategy that has already increased the number of premium seats in United’s schedule by nearly 40% compared to 2018.
Pan Am Had Prestige. United Has Reach.
None of this diminishes what Pan Am represented.
It was the flag carrier of an era when international travel still felt exclusive, when flying itself carried a certain glamour that has largely disappeared today. But that prestige was built in a constrained environment.
United is operating at a completely different scale.
It serves more cities than any other airline in the world, by a wide margin. It is adding destinations that would have seemed improbable even a decade ago. As United’s Chief Commercial Officer Andrew Nocella put it earlier this week, “the world is getting smaller for United,” a line that would have sounded trite not long ago.
And yet here we are, with routes stretching deeper into secondary and tertiary markets across the globe that make the Pan Am route network look small.
CONCLUSION
The comparison to Pan Am is about perspective, not nostalgia.
For all the focus on product tweaks, premium cabins, and onboard Wi-Fi, the most important story in U.S. aviation right now may be the sheer scale of what United has built (and indeed, what American Airlines and Delta Air Lines are also aiming to build).
A network that is not just larger than Pan Am’s, but structurally more complex, more connected, and arguably more powerful. Pan Am defined the golden age of international travel. Now United wants to define what comes after it.
> Read More: United Airlines May Restore Historic Pan Am Fifth Freedom Route
Finally, a note to my esteemed regular readers. I realize I’ve focused a lot on United Airlines this week and there is still more to share…a lot more, actually. My thoughts are that these sorts of pieces are unique to Live and Let’s Fly and you’d see the same focus and concentration of articles if I was invited to another airlines’s media day, as we saw when I covered Alaska Airlines’ first 787 delivery earlier this year. Thank you for reading!
it is all cool to compare UA to Pan Am but the more significant comparison is to UA’s current competitors.
UA gets less domestic revenue than AA or DL and has less total revenue than DL even though UA flies 10% more ASMs.
AA, DL, UA and every other US airline are for-profit airlines and most are publicly traded which mean they have an obligation to their shareholders above every other thing.
DL managed to generate more profits than UA – by almost $1.7 billion or 50% more than UA.
and, yes, a big part of that revenue difference is DL’s refinery which is easily saving DL hundreds of millions of dollars per quarter – at a rate that could, once again, easily exceed $1 billion for 2027.
DL proved long ago that it isn’t focused on being the largest airline in terms of passengers carried or cities served – because that is not what generates the most revenue or profit.
The real question, given that Scott Kirby frequently talks about how much he has learned from DL (and has copied DL’s strategies) is when UA will realize that its size strategy is not profit or revenue maximizing and, in fact, directly contributes to it failing to really be in the same league as DL even though UA talks like it is them and DL and THEN the rest of the US airline industry.
Dude, you’re just sad.
Take a break from shilling for DL and let the man write articles about other airlines. DL was mentioned once in this article and you decided to write a counter article. At this point you might as well open up your own site.
I just got tired of UA and those that shill for them pushing UA’s superiority in everything except what a for-profit company is supposed to do.
Again, why is it so hard for someone – actually a lot of someones – to accept that UA is more focused on metrics that matter more for the NYC subway than a for-profit company?
Tim – we are consumers. This is an aviation blog, not sell-side research. I don’t care if United is profitable, I care about costs for me and benefits to me. When airlines do cool things like make it so I can get to every inch of earth, I think it is awesome.
UA makes more money from airline operations than DL. DL’s advantage is from credit card revenue, an advantage that won’t last much longer, once UA and Chase have their new agreement.
Also, why do you keep talking about profits in terms of ASMs? That is not how profits are measured. You know that, we all know that. It just makes you lose credibility when you throw irrelevant data into the forum.
Profits are measured by yield, and there is a one point difference between UA and DL, and that gap has narrowed. UA’s EPS grew last year while DL’s shrank.
Scott Kirby has had great vision, especially during COVID, when he placed a record aircraft order at extremely attractive prices, while taking the steps to position UA where it is today.
UA is bigger than DL in NYC while making significantly more revenue, and they’ll be back in JFK next year, expanding their lead.
DL’s lead in LAX is down to a couple of points, and they’re not even in the top ten for cargo carriers, while UA is number 5. DL is pricing LAX-HKG at $125, showing how much struggle they have competing against others.
UA has been showing a huge amount of vision with their new products, including the most premium heavy widebody plane.
DL struggles to compete outside of its fortress hubs, but they are making attempts to copy UA by adding more premium seats (but lagging) and expanding with a few routes to Asia (but also lagging here).
Nothing against DL. They have fortress hubs, where local governments help them by blocking a new ATL airport, and credit card revenue, so they’ll be fine.
But UA has earned every bit of where they are, forced to compete in every hub city for decades upon decades.
Scooter,
except we are talking about UA mgmt that touts this stuff at the same time they talk about wanting to perform financially like DL.
The two are not compatible as they exist now.
If UA fans want to relish in the size of UA’s network, then don’t quote UA execs who say two things which they clearly are not capable of or willing to reconcile.
I knew you or one of UA’s employee internet warriors would show up and you didn’t disappoint, Mark.
The simple fact is that your manufactured metric fails to account for the costs of DL’s entire operation including the refinery.
and you still can’t answer why UA can’t generate more profits than DL if UA’s revenue generation is so superior.
It is beyond belief how deluded you are if you think DL is coying UA’s premium strategy including seats. DL diteched small regional jets over a decade ago and UA is rummaging through scrap yards to find any plane that it can put premium lawn chairs in to compete with AA and DL’s larger network of large regional jets and small mainline jets.
and that refinery that UA tried to copy will prove to be a huge deal this year. Yes, some carriers will pay a high price – perhaps higher – for high fuel costs but no airline will benefit as much from this crisis than DL.
Get back to us the 2nd week of January, right after the 2nd week of July and 2nd week of October and tell us how UA’s strategies are working.
and let’s not even get into the FAA having to referee UA network strategies in not just one but two UA hubs.
Mark said, “DL is pricing LAX-HKG at $125, showing how much struggle they have competing against others.”
Ouch! I thought it would be bad, but that is rough.
“UA makes more money from airline operations than DL.”
Someone likes to ignore that little fact.
rebel,
now tell us the loads that UA was carrying on LAX-HKG before DL announced its LAX-HKG service esp before it added tags beyond HKG? It is confirmed that it was well below 70% – so the notion that LAX-HKG was a strong market for UA is a myth.
The difference between UA and DL is that DL has the financial bandwidth to buy its way into major markets while UA operates large portions of its network under the justification of “strategic” flying – that happens to not make money – and THAT is why UA’s profits are so much less than DL’s even with UA’s $1 billion labor cost advantage – which is slowly disappearing and as fuel costs soar – which UA has no control over.
LAX-HKG is a big enough cargo market that DL is willing to use the A350’s superior cargo capacity to the 787 to offset weak passenger numbers.
The bigger issue, which you can’t answer, is why UA flies 10% more ASMs than DL but makes just 2/3 of what DL makes.
and the reality is that the gap will only widen as DL gains up to a $1 billion fuel cost advantage. UA is so convinced that it will use its financial strength to take share from other carriers while DL will use its cost advantages to take REVENUE from multiple other carriers including UA over the Pacific. The A350 is simply a superior aircraft to the 787 in capability and cost efficiency.
UA has said for years that UA was beating up on the ULCCs and yet NK and B6 are the most fragile airlines in the US and they are far larger in DL markets than UA’s.
2026 is DL’s year to prove that UA is not anywhere close to being in DL’s league.
1990
DL knows full well that it can push labor costs higher for everyone including UA because DL generates the revenue to support those labor costs.
UA employees have subsidized UA’s growth for years; in 2026, UA will face higher labor costs, higher fuel costs, and massive capex. UA will look much more tarnished by the end of the year.
@LTD, Funny you should ask. United’s November and December, seat load factors rose to 85.5% and 86.0%, respectively since they added BKK & SGN. Another smart move by UA management.
@PM, the 80% is international and is due to the nature of the hub & spoke system and FF programs. I’m sure it is the same for foreign carriers except for the ME3 due to small local populations and limited O&D traffic.
Cargo Revenue 2025
UA: $1.8B
DL: $0.9B
United generates 100% more cargo revenue than Delta. Impressive!
rebel
of course when you stick low yield, high volume destinations beyond HKG, you push the LF up. It doesn’t change the fact that UA probably does not make money on LAX-HKG and simply doubled down w/ tags which increased costs faster than revenue.
and, of course, UA generates the most cargo revenue of the big 3 – that is what you get w/ size.
and yet the 787 can’t carry anywhere near close to as much cargo as the A350 even in the -900 version and DL will be rapidly deploying the 35K which is by far the most cost efficient and capable widebody and also a great cargo hauler.
It isn’t just UA passenger revenue that DL is going after but also cargo revenue. and given that UA thinks that Rolls Royce should give it 10 year old pricing on engines, there is no chance that UA will have a comparable widebody to DL’s 35Ks for at least 5 years and perhaps even longer.
I love it. Tiny Tim asks for the loads and when they turn out to be great he moves to imagined yields. Sorry little fella, but everyone tried to tell you the advantages UA has in the Pacific, but you dismissed them. Par for your course. Master stroke by UA to use their extensive route authorities. And let us know when and if DL gets its first a35X. Hopefully, the interiors will be approved and available this time unlike those A321s with 44 seats instead of lie flat seat/beds. It’ll take a lot of those 35Xs to close that 100% cargo gap.
Have you figured out why Delta is so incompetent when it comes to installing and refurbishing aircraft interiors? Maybe the GE Six Sigma COO can get to the bottom of it. He also seems to be doing a great job of pissing off the pilots if their posts on Airline Pilot Forums are any indication. No wonder Delta’s 2026 operational performance is so poor especially after weather events. Yikes!
If Tim was honest, he’d admit Delta’s strategy is to wait for United and others to set their compensation, then swoop-in to offer just slightly more.
1990
Most of what Tim wrote above about UA is just his usual nonsense and vitriol about United. Who knows what dark weird place that comes from but it isn’t really the case that Delta waits around to set compensation based on other carriers.
For better or worse, Delta has generally been the trend setter on wages, particularly with their unionized pilots, but also with their non-union employees — it’s part of the Delta strategy to get raises out there first as the “leaders” in compensation since Delta corporate is terrified about unionization of their flight attendants, mechanics, and agents of all kinds.
Given your constant virtue signaling about unions, it’s rather ironic you fly Delta so much 1990, it’s a very anti union airline
Max,
you can spew your drivel all you want but DL pays its employees more because they generate more revenue per employee than any other US airline.
Not only are DL employees more efficient but they support DL’s plan to get the most premium revenue in the industry.
It is a positive cycle, not one of being reactionary.
and it also doesn’t that DL has led the industry in pay increases esp. psot covid. Factor in the fuel savings which the refinery has delivery to DL in 2022 and will again this year and perhaps into 2027, and DL can pay its employees more because of advantages on both the revenue and the cost side.
and as much as UA likes to think it is “above the line” where DL doesn’t pick on UA, the launch of LAX-HKG which elicited no response from UA proves that most airlines realize they cannot get into a pi789ng contest w/ DL so they don’t try. DL doesn’t engage in anti-competitive market share wars but they strategically grow their network including in other carrier strength markets.
There will be more and more markets launched by DL in UA strength markets even as carriers like NK, F9 and B6 weaken relative to DL
LTD says, “the launch of LAX-HKG which elicited no response from UA”
Wow, even I thought you knew more about the airline biz than that. Yikes!
MaxPower says, “Delta corporate is terrified about unionization of their flight attendants, mechanics, and agents of all kinds.”
Bingo!
Tim. You are the most biased Delta employee I’ve ever seen. Do you forget Delta was on the verge of liquidating in 2008?? Gone. Poof. Yes they turned it around and a big way of that is all the long haul flying that is outsourced. United has almost double the widebodies. Better check ypur numbers on the refinery. Was loosing big time up until the war. Now go back to your baggage handler job at delta and ask your misinformation.
Matthew, you know when you are doing so well when “that guy” compulsively comes along to turn something positive into something negative. He is like the guy at a party where everyone is having a really good time except for him so he has to drop a know what in the punch bowel to get some attention.
I love it. Tiny Tim asks for the loads and when they turn out to be great he moves to imagined yields. Sorry little fella, but everyone tried to tell you the advantages UA has in the Pacific, but you dismissed them. Par for your course. Master stroke by UA to use their extensive route authorities. And let us know when and if DL gets its first a35X. Hopefully, the interiors will be approved and available this time unlike those A321s with 44 seats instead of lie flat seat/beds. It’ll take a lot of those 35Xs to close that 100% cargo gap.
Have you figured out why Delta is so incompetent when it comes to installing and refurbishing aircraft interiors? Maybe the GE Six Sigma COO can get to the bottom of it. He also seems to be doing a great job of pissing off the pilots if their posts on Airline Pilot Forums are any indication. No wonder Delta’s 2026 operational performance is so poor especially after weather events. Yikes!
you seriously think that social media is at all reflective of real life?
Between your time under Kirby’s desk and your time on social media, you have no clue how the world works.
DL has about 900 more mainline aircraft w/ high speed free WiFi and hundreds more aircraft w/ AVOD than UA does right now.
It would only be a hypocrite like you that would dare to bring up WiFi and AVOD comparisons. WN is the only big 4 airline that UA leads; even AA has more a/c with high speed WiFi than UA does.
and it took putting a couple stations in SE Asia behind HKG to get the LFs up to 70%… but that still does’nt mean they carry any decent revenue.
And it also doesn’t change that DL can clearly do what it wants at LAX and UA isn’t about to resond because they know DL will kick their wide ride backside.
btw, did you ask your little buddy Jon what DL has up its sleeve for LAX? He’s convinced DL is going to do some more butt kicking.
LTD lecturing others that social media isn’t real life. That’s a shame for you. You can’t make this stuff up. Please buy yourself a mirror.
I look forward to seeing if any of your predictions ever come true. Right now I give a broke. Clock the edge over you. Poor LTD.
It’s interesting that, having expanded their seasonal flying to tertiary destinations such as Bari and SCQ, they still don’t see any value in trying to capture local demand from major European conurbations which aren’t big destinations for Americans (e.g. LYS, MRS, BHX, MAN, DUS, STR, HAM, WAW, OTP, CPH, OSL, WAW…).
On the face of it, this doesn’t look like a logical way of building a long-haul network and to me it indicates that they’re less in the business of flying people and more in that of monetising credit cards and associated products- not that there’s anything massively wrong with that.
United is hitting on all cylinders and their international network is amazing especially in light of all the markets that have been marginalized by war and post-Covid.
LTD says, “I just got tired of UA”
I bet. It’s just a matter of time.
PM says, “It’s interesting that…they still don’t see any value in trying to capture local demand from major European conurbations which aren’t big destinations for Americans”
80%+ customers of US carriers are from the US so you answered your own question.
The 80% statistic is meaningless on its own – you’d expect Americans to be the vast majority of pax within their enormous domestic networks. If, on the other hand, it’s 80% of their international pax, surely the question must be why they can’t grab a decent amount of local market share in the countries to which they fly.
My hunch is that it doesn’t make sense for them to chase foreign customers because they don’t make money on the flying itself and they’re not able to meaningfully sell credit cards in other jurisdictions- in fact, UA have just launched a paid debit card here in the UK which is extremely weak compared to other travel loyalty cards. As I said, that’s just a hunch – be interesting to see if there’s any evidence, or even indication, that something else is going on.
PM says, “If, on the other hand, it’s 80% of their international pax, surely the question must be why they can’t grab a decent amount of local market share in the countries to which they fly.”
It is 80%+ of international pax and it is the natural result of airline hub and spoke systems and frequent flier programs. I am sure it is similar for foreign airlines other than the ME3 have relatively small local populations.
what any of us in the aviation world get sick of is the arrogance and downright lies and maniplation that come out of Chicago and are echoed by the people that UA pays to defend it on the internet.
After the FAA stepped in and capped flights at EWR, Kirby said that they got what they wanted – even though he repeatedly asked for slot controls to be reimposed – which DID NOT happen.
and then after the FAA stepped in AGAIN due to UA’s overscheduling of EWR, UA said “we never wanted to add that many flights and we are grateful that the FAA stepped in”
UA is run by a bunch of pathological liars and their fan club follows the same MO.
UA is a second tier airline that is incapable of admitting who it really is
Tim, I used to shill for AA but honestly United just pays me more to spew lies for them. I also like the barista coffee in EWR. It’s 2026, follow the money, amirite?
They don’t need to fly to the ports you mentioned because they can connect you with their alliance partners at FRA, MUC, ZRH or LHR, from which the entire European continent is accessible, and beyond.
That’s neither here nor there – it’s not like there aren’t multiple daily flights between those hubs and the provincial airports in Spain, Italy, Croatia etc where the likes of UA now fly 2-3 times a week.
It’s simple geometry in that many of the cities are in southern & western Europe or this side of LH hubs in FRA & MUN, but it depends on the size of the market too. DEL, BOM & DXB are different animals with Alliance hubs and code sharing. If they can make $ UA and other airlines will serve markets in the medium to long term. If not they won’t.
Too bad American is not called TWA and Delta is not called Northwest or Pan Am. Wouldn’t it be nice if the big 3 were United, TWA, and Pan Am?
Greetings to the cherished memories of both Pan Am and TWA!
Thank you UA for still existing and for continuing to develop and grow! “Good Leads The Way” and it shows!
Pan Am’s logo was indeed quite original and cool. It was an iconic symbol that defined an air travel era and continues to inspire the next.
It’s worth remembering that PA and UA were roughly the same age until Pan Am ceased operations in December 1991.
Let’s add that, as of March 28, 2026, UA has 1095 jetliners in its fleet with an average of 15.3 years.
It is not doubt that today’s UAL international routes network is larger than Pan Am’s heyday. Delta and AAL can also make similar claim.
However, which metrics did United’s Patrick Quayle use to claim that UAL’s international network is FOUR times larger? Available seat miles? Passengers flied? Number of routes? Number of cities?
Some cities Pan Am flew back in 1970s, like Helsinki, Istanbul, Kuala-Lumpur, are still not served by any U.S. passenger airlines.
Pan Am was and is – in my memory if not in existence – my favorite airline. Period. I believe that to this day I’ve flown more miles on Pan Am than any other airline. When I started off as a very young full time travel agent in the later 80’s in Miami, Pan Am was a huge power, even as a shadow of its’ former self.
Comparing Pan Am and United is tough. For most of its’ existence Pan Am had no way to fly passengers domestically, remaining a purely international airline. When the government forced Pan Am to divest parts of itself like PANAGRA and accept competition across the Atlantic through TWA and the Pacific through Northwest Orient, Pan Am was clearly promised a domestic network to make up for the new competition everywhere else. That promise was never carried out, which was a huge factor in the demise of Pan Am.
Another factor is the post-WWII legacy that created Pan Am hubs in NRT, HNL, FRA, LHR, JFK, and others. Combined with aircraft range constraints it was an entirely different dynamic. There were no nonstop flights from the USA to Australia, Hong Kong, or South Africa because commercial airplanes simply couldn’t go that far without refueling. Hubs became a necessity and U.S. victory in WWII enabled Pan Am to create foreign hubs, useful in some cases such as flying to Berlin as the USSR refused to allow German commercial planes to fly to Berlin so some airline had to carry passengers.
There were also no Open Skies agreements that have now become commonplace. If Pan Am wanted to initiate a new route somewhere then they needed permission from the foreign government. If there was a flag carrier for that country then the country often didn’t want Pan Am coming in to take away their business. Nowadays if United wants to initiate Denver – Amsterdam service they have no major governmental constraints and can set it up in a couple of months. In the 40’s through the 80’s it took vastly longer under the best of circumstances. Many Eastern European countries that now have USA air service could only be flown to under fairly stringent conditions, causing further complications for new routes.
There’s more but bottom line, Pan Am to United at present is comparing two completely different worlds. If Pan Am had been permitted a robust domestic network and had better management from Deregulation on then they might still exist today. Nevertheless, in many ways United’s success is built on Pan Am’s bones. Not only did Pan Am enable the existence of the 747 which was big enough and had enough range to revolutionize air travel making flying much more egalitarian but they sold United their Pacific network, providing United with planes, personnel, and bases that showed United how to be a big international airline.
Christian,
well said and good comparison but let’s not forget that UA is really built on Pan Am’s Pacific network and its LHR slots.
UA bought Pan Am’s Latin America network and tried to grow a MIA hub but was crushed by AA.
DL bought Pan Am’s TATL network minus the LHR operation and the Shuttle. DL hired more Pan Am people so, at best, Pan Am was split between DL and UA.
UA did make the move to acquire Pan Am’s Pacific network and built SFO into a massively successful and unparalled TPAC hub but UA’s TPAC network was further augmented by the Continental merger. Alot of the dots in the Pacific came from CO as well as strength from NYC to Asia, with some of the CO TPAC routes ended during the Russia-Ukraine war.
Let’s also not forget that UA leaned heavily into the size of its international network at the expense of building a domestic network, following on the heels of CO which heavily used RJs to major cities even from a market as big as EWR.
It wasn’t until DL showed UA how valuable credit card partnerships can be esp. in large coastal markets that UA realized it had to build its domestic network and that is the phase where UA is right now.
2026 will be another watershed year for aviation because of high fuel prices. Some carriers will fail while others will be weakened. Others will benefit from the weakness of other carriers.
In a couple years, I suspect that a lot of UA’s bluster about its size will have been reduced because many of these small dots on their route map just don’t make sense at fuel prices.
Although not much covered, UA has already reduced or cancelled some of its smaller routes to Europe.
There will be more.
Poor LTD and all his erroneous predictions. Riyadh Air & Asia Air delivery slots, NYC share, $1B in MRO profits, UA FAs’ service, etc. Yikes!
you certainly do work overtime to shut down the truth that you don’t want to hear.
It’s been funny watching you come unglued with all the news from UA’s media day when you claim you only post to counter disinformation in the comments section. Your actions undermine your obviously erroneous contention. Pretty entertaining though.
me unglued?
It is actually you and your ilk.
If what I said to say wasn’t true, you wouldn’t need to counter w/ a response.
The fact that you and others incessantly and compulsively jump in to argue against what I write says that you know full well that what I say is factual – and facts are not your friend
Pan Am died for many reasons. UA lives today based on a whole lot of arrogance that has repeatedly proven to be fatal for businesses of all kinds.
UA is simply not a first rate airline other than as a mass transportation enterprise – but it vastly underperforms on metrics which should matter both as a for-profit airline and as a competitor in a region of the world where service matters the most.
UA’s future is not as solid as you and others want to believe.
this fuel cost crisis is the complete opposite of during covid; UA is now at a major cost disadvantage. If AS can warn that its losses will double based on one month’s worth of very high cots fuel, UA as a major player to Asia and with the highest fuel costs of the big 4 will most certainly be disproportionately impacted.
add in that the weakest airlines in the industry are not in UA’s backyard but DL’s and 2026 will widen the earnings gap between DL and UA SUBSTANTIALLY
Forgoing the Comments section, this is the type of article that caused me to bookmark Live and Let’s Fly many years ago. Thank you for highlighting the wondrous age of aviation, Matthew.
Thank you, Pete.
United Airlines’ history can be considered the most astonishing in commercial airline background, second only to Pan American World Airways.