United just restructured MileagePlus to punish non-cardholders. The bigger question is whether it will grow Chase card signups or push miles lovers elsewhere.
United Airlines announced this week that MileagePlus is getting its biggest overhaul in more than a decade, taking effect April 2, 2026. The headlines have understandably focused on the winners. Primary cardholders earn more miles per dollar on United flights, get at least 10% off every award ticket, see that discount climb to 15% with Premier status, and gain access to Saver Award inventory in Polaris business class that was previously reserved for high-tier elites. Great – if you have the card.
What has gotten less attention is everything United is taking away from members who do not. Non-cardholders drop from earning five miles per dollar on United flights down to three. Basic Economy passengers without the card earn nothing at all. And Polaris Saver inventory, long one of the best uses of United miles for anyone with a Chase Ultimate Rewards product sitting in their wallet? Gone, unless you also carry a United co-branded card. The restructuring is not subtle. United wants you in its credit card ecosystem, and it is not asking nicely.
Why United Needs This to Work
The revenue numbers explain the urgency. Delta pulled $8.2 billion from its American Express relationship in 2025, on its way to a stated target of $10 billion annually by 2029. American Airlines collected $6.1 billion from Citi and Barclays in 2024, with similar aspirations. United brought in roughly $3.2 billion from Chase in the same period. That gap is significant. Delta is earning more than twice what United is from its bank partnership, and the difference is essentially the spread between United being a profitable airline and a very profitable one. It’s more than that though:
“To give a sense of scale, Delta CEO Ed Bastian told investors in June that roughly 1% of the entire US economy is spend on Delta’s credit cards.” – NY Post
Nearly one-in-three SkyMiles members carries an American Express co-branded card. United has not disclosed its equivalent figure, but given the revenue gap, it is safe to assume the penetration rate is significantly lower. The entire MileagePlus restructuring is United’s attempt to close that gap through a combination of carrots for cardholders and sticks for everyone else.
The Chase Complication Nobody Is Talking About
Here is where the strategy gets interesting and where it could either work brilliantly or backfire. Chase Ultimate Rewards is the exclusive transfer partner for United Mileage Plus. No other US bank has access to United, which has historically been a meaningful piece of the program’s appeal. Chase Sapphire Reserve and Sapphire Preferred cardholders (and Chase Ink products) have long treated United miles as a natural home for aspirational redemptions. Long-haul Polaris, Star Alliance partner awards on ANA or Lufthansa are the kind of redemptions that genuinely justify the annual fees on a premium Chase card.
United isn’t the only North American global carrier, however. Air Canada offers a competent worldwide product, comparable connections to Newark/New York, has a more competitive award chart, and a brand people will trust that is also part of the Star Alliance.
Starting April 2nd, 2026, a large portion of redemptions become significantly less attractive without a United card in hand. The whole point of transferring to United for Polaris was the Saver Award inventory. That inventory is now a cardholder-exclusive benefit. A Chase Sapphire Reserve holder who does not have a United card and wants business class to Tokyo is no longer getting the same deal, and they know it. If the jump in prices is enough to send them looking around, Air Canada is the easiest and smartest choice.
The question United is betting on is whether that realization drives them to get the United card. It probably will for some. The frequent United flyer who already holds a Sapphire Reserve and has been passing on the United card may decide the award discounts and Saver access justify opening one. That is the conversion United wants, and it is a reasonable assumption that a meaningful number of people will make exactly that call.
Where the Math Could Break Down
The risk is the other category of users. Savvy Chase Ultimate Rewards points collector who is not particularly loyal to United and treats MileagePlus as one tool among many will alter their approach. For that traveler, the same UR points that might have gone to United can now go to Air Canada Aeroplan, which books Star Alliance partners at least as well and does not require a co-branded card to access decent Saver inventory. British Airways Avios is another Chase transfer option for long-haul redemptions on familiar products. Partners like Singapore are harder to deal with in the event a change is required, Virgin Atlantic has a broad network to the US but a limited global footprint, while Air France/KLM scare some away with higher co-pays on award bookings. However, none of those programs just punish travelers for not having their credit card.
The worry for United is that the marginal non-cardholder, the one they most need to convert, decides that getting a fourth or fifth credit card is not worth it and quietly redirects their Chase spend in favor of Aeroplan or just stops thinking of United miles as the destination for their points. If that happens at scale, United has not just failed to grow its card business. It has weakened the Chase relationship by reducing the transfer volume that makes United attractive as a Chase partner in the first place.
The Bet And Whether It Pays Off
None of this is to say the restructuring is a mistake. It is clearly modeled on Delta’s playbook of finding ways to make their cards part of their clients lives, and Delta’s results are hard to argue with. The difference is that Delta built its cardholder base before it began similar redemption limitations for members that are not cardholders. Whether United can drive signups through subtraction rather than addition is the question the industry will be watching closely after what will feel like a special 48-hour version of an April Fools joke.
What seems unlikely is a clean win. United will convert some non-cardholders and lose some transfer volume from members who redirect to Aeroplan or other member airlines. Whether those conversions outpace the losses is genuinely unclear, and the Chase relationship adds a wrinkle United does not fully control. Delta could engineer its card business largely on its own terms. United is threading a needle with its most important commercial partner watching the same numbers.
What do you think?
I look at this as United virtually ending its Mileage Plus frequent flyer program. Instead, United has launched its Mileage Plus credit card program.
For occasional (which could mean flying every other month) and silver level flyers, you won’t earn much without a United/Chase credit card. If you are gold or higher, you probably have enough business travel to easily fit a United card among your credit card portfolio.
United has a big advantage at its hubs, as do other airlines have at their hubs. However, travel between non-hub cities, like Columbus, Ohio to Tucson or Tampa to Reno have several choices.
The real question is why so many people spend so much on Delta Amex cards when their miles are so utterly worthless. Why does Delta have such a spend advantage?