Regulatory developments have stalled United Airlines’ planned minority investment in Brazilian carrier Azul, highlighting how even relatively modest equity moves can draw intense scrutiny, especially in a market as politically and economically sensitive as Brazil in the era of Trump.
United Airlines’ Investment In Azul Hits Pause As Brazil Regulator Suspends Final Approval
United Airlines had been moving forward on a plan to increase its minority stake in Azul Linhas Aéreas Brasileiras from roughly 2% to 8%, a roughly $100 million strategic investment tied to Azul’s ongoing restructuring as the Brazilian airline works its way out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Regulators had previously granted unconditional approval to the transaction, but that approval has now been suspended pending further review, as noted by Simple Flying.
Brazil’s antitrust authority, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), paused the final clearance certificate after a third-party consumer organization petitioned for closer scrutiny of the transaction. That suspension does not invalidate prior approvals, but it does place the deal in regulatory limbo while CADE evaluates whether the intervening party’s arguments merit reopening the competitive review. The group has been given a limited window to submit supporting evidence. If that documentation is insufficient, the request will likely be dismissed and the approval may resume. If it is admitted, a tribunal proceeding could follow that would either uphold or overturn the deal.
The practical impact so far is procedural rather than terminal. United’s planned equity increase, which would deepen its financial involvement in Azul and strengthen a relationship that already includes codeshares and network cooperation, remains intact for the moment. However, the regulatory pause introduces uncertainty around timing and investor confidence, and it underscores how cross-border airline investments, even minority stakes, can trigger a variety of concerns in major markets, genuine or otherwise.
How Much Is At Stake For Azul And United?
At first glance, an 8% stake might seem modest, but it carries strategic significance. United already holds a minority position in Azul and has long cultivated a partnership with the Brazilian carrier, including codeshare agreements connecting major U.S. hubs to Brazil and beyond. Increasing that stake is a way for United to reinforce that partnership as Azul seeks liquidity and stability after a turbulent financial period.
Azul entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in May 2025 to address heavy debt and operational challenges shared by many Latin American airlines in recent years. A U.S. bankruptcy judge approved Azul’s restructuring plan late last year, and the carrier aims to emerge from bankruptcy in early 2026 with a leaner balance sheet.
For United, the investment signals confidence in Brazil’s aviation market and in Azul’s long-term viability, while also positioning United favorably against competitors like American Airlines, which is also planning its own investment as part of Azul’s restructuring. That said, the regulatory pause means that United’s increased stake cannot yet be finalized, even though the underlying approval process had appeared complete.
It was in 2006, nearly 20 years ago, when Brazilian carrier Varig, a Star Alliance member, went out. Star Alliance is weakest in South America and United’s investment in Azul could pave the way for the carrier to eventually join Star Alliance.
CONCLUSION
United’s planned investment in Azul represents a strategic deepening of ties with Brazil’s third-largest airline at a pivotal moment in its restructuring. The pause in final approval from Brazil’s antitrust regulator injects uncertainty into a transaction that had appeared ready to move forward. Whether this proves to be a short procedural delay or a more substantive regulatory challenge will determine how quickly United and Azul can turn this investment into a stronger, long-term partnership.
As is known, following Star Alliance member UA, oneworld member AA is also expected to be next in line for strategic investment in AD, so CADE approval will not be delayed much longer…
And Matt’s one of the few that have actually flown and reviewed Azul’s a330!
True… Note that Azul has 5 A330-900 jetliners in its current fleet with an average age of 6.2 years.
Is anyone really surprised that the Brazilian regulator would have put a block on investment by a US carrier given the current climate?
Things I love about Azul:
-RRJ Airport
Things I hate about Azul:
-VCP
I feel like VCP hinders Azul from really being as relevant as they should. Their main hub is basically PHL. Nobody really wants to go there. G3 dominates SDU and CGH, not to mention GIG and GRU, and to me that makes the difference. Azul is nicer on paper, but unless you’re flying in to RRJ, you’re nearly always better off on Gol or Latam.
I would agree that VCP is not ideal if coming from São Paulo.
Thanks for mentioning RRJ- I stayed in Barra de Tijuca during both of my visits to RJ and hadn’t realised that it’s got its very own airport!
RRJ? The small Jacarepaguá airport only allows Azul’s Cessna Grand Caravans to operate. It’s a long and bumpy flight to VCP or São Paulo.
Also CNF. You say bumpy, I say exhilarating. And if you’re going between CGH and Barra the airport is literally amazing. I LOVE Azul Conecta.
Aren’t AA supposed to be bezzy mates with Gol nowadays? Makes no sense to have a partnership with one company while looking to become a strategic investor in its main rival.
LATAM also are rather confused in having such a close relationship with DL/VS yet maintaining quite strong links with Iberia and even cooperating with Lufthansa. I’m hoping that Gol will eventually get itself aligned to Avianca and join *A as Brazil is almost the size of a continent and the Southern Cone is one of the few places where *G status isn’t super helpful.
Azul’s network offers minimal connectivity to US carriers who fly to GRU, not VCP.
and all of the attempts by AA and UA to partner with S. American carriers pales in comparison with the multi-country JV that DL and LA have.
DOT data indicates that UA loses money flying to Latin America and the 3rd quarter of 2025 was one of their lowest points. They are desperately looking at something that will pull them out of 3rd place position in S. America.
The logical thing for UA would be to work with their regional alliance partner which is trying to merge with Gol and build a network that’s at least as comprehensive as LATAM’s. That’s probably too sensible an idea for them though!
And yet UA has grown in Latin America over the last ten years and DL has shrunk to 3rd.
TLAT Destinations 2016/2025: AA: 92/97, UA: 57/66 , DL: 58/52
Presumably the response to that would be that DL rely on LA metal for some of their routes. Generally speaking, Tim is right that LATAM is the biggest player in the region. On the other hand, Brazil is very big and has enormous growth potential as a market, so it’s not the end of the world for Azul or Avianca/Gol if they’re a bit short in terms of routes in/to places like Chile, Peru and Uruguay.
the response that matters is that DL makes flying flying to Latin America while UA loses money and has consistently done so for several years.
AA has a leadership position in the region and has for years.
The LA joint venture gives DL a commanding #2 position
UA can’t stand to be #3 in anything so they have dumped all kinds of capacity into Latin America and lose money in the process.
UA is a for-profit business and the reason why they trail DL in financial metrics is precisely because their execs cannot contain their need to be larger in something – capacity growth – so they fall to the bottom of the industry in metrics that matter.
None of which changes that Azul’s network is the least valuable to a US carrier. LA operates longhaul widebody flights while Gol has a major position at the largest Brazilian airports; Azul has widebody flights but to non-UA gateways on either end and is smaller than LA and Gol at the largest Brazilian airports.
That’s only true using a warped definition of what matters. CGH alone handles about 20 million pax per year, and most of them are on purely domestic itineraries. Total traffic between the USA and Brazil is less than a quarter of that number- still an important market, but definitely not what keeps Gol/LATAM/Azul flying.
and none of the purely domestic traffic within any country is part of a JV w/ a US carrier – but it doesn’t change that AA and DL have partners in Latin America that deliver passengers to the gateways that those two US airlines serve. UA has much, much less traffic at UA’s gateways of GIG and GRU.
and it is indeed possible to book a connection inbound to CGH and out on an international flight at GRU, just as it is possible to book a connection between LGA and JFK. It isn’t always the fastest option but that isn’t the only factor that people consider including that LGA and CGH have lots more shorthaul domestic service than JFK or GRU has
At the end of the story, UA is at a distinct disadvantage to AA’s size in South America and DL’s JV w/ Latam. It isn’t a surprise that Latin America is now the region of the world where UA consistently loses money.